Most invasive species control programs are routine, but a small number prompt public controversy. Local value predispositions shape lay perception of the relative risks of invasive species and efforts to control them. Because control efforts are generally led by government scientists, lay perceptions of invasive species science are colored by public judgment of government credibility. This article examines the proposed release of an insect for biological control of the invasive strawberry guava tree which threatens conservation of Hawaii's forests. A local activist manipulated regulatory risk communication, appealed to local values, and persuaded some local members of the public and elected officials to oppose the insect release. This case illustrates how, in the absence of effective public engagement processes, routine scientific risk communication can be confounded by divergent knowledge taxonomies and perceptions of government hegemony.
Introduction
People purposefully and unintentionally introduce non-indigenous species to new environments. Purposefully introduced species, such as horticultural plants, bring economic benefits, but they can "escape" from human cultivation to "naturalize" and threaten populations of native endangered species and the functioning of ecosystems. Conservation scientists perceive virtually all (purposefully or not) introduced species as potential environmental threats which oblige public agencies to actively exclude or manage (Simberloff, 2005) . Conservation scientists now rank harmful introduced (non-indigenous) species as one of the most serious threats to biological diversity (Van Driesche and Van Driesche, 2004 ) and ecosystem services (Mack et al., 2000) , and a threat to many Agriculture introduced an African parasitoid wasp to biologically control the gall wasp. This was portrayed favorably by media, and apparently enjoyed broad public support (Dingeman, 2010) .
Local value predispositions shape lay perception of the relative risks of invasive species and efforts to control them. In Hawaii, after nearly two decades of research, the US Forest Service proposed the release of a non-native insect to reduce the reproduction of the invasive strawberry guava tree (Psidium cattleianum). The proposal to introduce a non-native organism for biological control of a non-native tree serves a case within this STS case study, for it confronted lay publics and local officials with a specific decision, one that required them to disclose their perceptions of scientific knowledge.
This article examines the risk assessment and communication associated with the proposed release of a biocontrol agent targeting strawberry guava in Hawaii. It describes how scientists came to identify P. cattleianum as a suitable target for classical biocontrol, and how they assessed and communicated the risks of introducing a non-native gall-forming insect. It then summarizes some local value predispositions (e.g., concerns about local autonomy, suspicion of the federal government) that shaped public perception of the forest, the tree and the proposed introduction. It then explains how an activist appealed to these values in his campaign to block the insect introduction. It presents qualitative data to show how this activist drew from routine scientific risk communication in his contrarian interpretation, and how public comments and public officials echoed his rhetorical framing. Expert risk communication was confounded by divergent knowledge taxonomies and perceptions of government power.
We present this as an example of a "real world experiment" in the public understanding of science (Gross, 2007) . It draws from 23 interviews conducted between 2007 and 2010, and from the experience of one of the authors (Kinslow) as an employee for the US Forest Service. Methodologically, it examines public communication processes and further develops a middle way between ethnographic and survey approaches (Nisbet and Goidel, 2007) .
Targeting strawberry guava
Hawaii is an area of special conservation concern for several reasons: as the most remote archipelago in the world, its ecosystems are quite small and thus are highly vulnerable to disruption by introduced species (Gagne, 1988) ; it is host to more rare and endangered species than any other state in the US (Cox, 1999) ; many non-native species have been introduced with many serious negative consequences (Cox, 1999; Van Driesche and Van Driesche, 2004) . Island ecosystems appear to be particularly vulnerable to invasive plants (Denslow, 2003) . Hawaiian residents are generally aware of the problems of introduced species, with one survey reporting over 80% supporting "strict limits on importing harmful alien pests" (HCA, 2003: 11) . The Island of Hawaii (commonly known as the Big Island) is of particular conservation interest because it has more land area than all the other Hawaiian Islands put together (Loope, 1998) , suggesting that investment in conservation here has the greatest likelihood of return (Goldstein et al., 2008) .
Horticulturalists introduced the strawberry guava tree as an ornamental plant and fruit tree in 1825, but it subsequently "escaped" into local forests, where it became more vigorous and formed monotypic stands that suppress Hawaiian understory plants, and threaten the fauna that depend upon them. It has become so widespread that it has received a native Hawaiian name, "waiawi," and some members of the public perceive it to be native. Strawberry guava is in the same plant genus as the commercially grown common guava (Psidium guajava), but is genetically distant. Both produce fruit, although P. cattleianum fruit is small, difficult to harvest, and of negligible commercial value (Wikler and Smith, 2002) .
P. cattleianum was identified as a serious weed in 1954 (Hosaka and Thistle, 1954) and threat to Hawaiian ecosystems in 1982 (Gardner and Davis, 1982) , and is one of the most disruptive invasive plants of tropical and subtropical islands worldwide (Denslow, 2003; Wikler and Smith, 2002) . It has been called the "worst pest in Hawaii's rain forests" (Smith, 1985: 250) . Its fruit serve as alternate hosts for introduced fruit flies, which then move to commercial fruit crops, causing direct economic losses to farmers. These flies prevent the export of untreated soft fruit which constrains the tropical fruit industry in Hawaii (Wikler and Smith, 2002) . Thus, controlling P. cattleianum could simultaneously improve farmer economics and address conservation goals. Mechanical and chemical control efforts are expensive and impractical given the widespread presence of P. cattleianum on the Big Island.
Scientists identified biocontrol as the only viable strategy for long-term management of P. cattleianum (Smith, 1985) . Exploration for control insects in Brazil was begun in 1988. In 1993, researchers identified Tectococcus ovatus as a scale insect that would only attack P. cattleianum, and began laboratory tests to ensure that it would be simultaneously effective and specific to the target tree. T. ovatus produces galls on leaves and stunts growth of new branches, and it can slow reproduction.
Biological control (biocontrol) research has been particularly active in Hawaii with introductions dating back to the 1890s to address crop pests (Reimer, 2002) . Biocontrol is the use of introduced or manipulated natural enemies (predators, parasitoids, pathogens) to control pests (Huffaker and Messenger, 1976) . One form, classical biocontrol, introduces exotic natural enemies to reduce the population of an introduced pest (whether insect or weed), informed by the principles of plantinsect ecology. When successful, this "most powerful ecological technology" (Lockwood, 1996) provides control indefinitely without additional cost. However, a few early introductions were uninformed by science and poorly conceived, resulting in a few biocontrol agents that have caused more harm than benefit (Simberloff and Stiling, 1996) . A small number of conservation scientists perceive biocontrol introductions to be "part of the much larger problem of the invasion of new areas by alien species, which are recognized as a major factor in species extinctions" (Howarth, 1991: 486) . This framing of biocontrol agents in the same category as "alien" invasive species has prompted much scientific controversy, but confirms the rhetorical power of appealing to pollution and purity as generic human concerns (Douglas, 1966) .
In the 1970s, the State of Hawaii required proposed biocontrol agents to undergo several layers of review, including county (Messing and Wright, 2006; Reimer, 2002) . Biocontrol agent introductions have come under increased regulatory scrutiny by government agencies over the past few decades, but there is no dedicated law governing this in the US or Hawaii. Thus, proposed biocontrol introductions are evaluated by governments using quarantine regulations, originally written to screen out agricultural pests (Strong and Pemberton, 2000) . Scientists have debated how best to conduct risk assessment of biocontrol introductions and articulate this with regulatory review (Messing and Wright, 2006) . Entomologist Tracy Johnson was hired by the US Forest Service to conduct biocontrol research on invasive forest plants in Hawaii. He completed the laboratory testing, begun in 1999, which confirmed the exclusive relationship between T. ovatus and P. cattleianum. Johnson was aware of general concerns about biocontrol introductions, and the skeptical stance held by some conservation scientists, especially in Hawaii. He sought to present the introduction of T. ovatus to the public as a part of a broader suite of forest conservation efforts in Hawaii. He did so by posting his permit applications on a US Forest Service web page (Johnson, 2005) 343, or HRS 343) . This act was written to require consideration of the environmental and social impacts of development projects, not invasive species management, although it had been used for this purpose. EAs are planning documents to identify a range of options to public agency decision makers (Andrews, 1999) . In the absence of a dedicated law governing biocontrol, regulators have expanded the reach of HRS 343 to include biocontrol releases on state lands. This was to be the final scientific risk communication to a regulatory agency prior to release.
The conservation network was united in perceiving the threat of P. cattleianum to Hawaiian forest ecosystems. The Hawaiian Conservation Alliance (HCA), a network of federal, state and county agencies, plus state universities and non-profit organizations issued a position paper affirming biocontrol as a forest invasive species management tool (HCA, 2005) . Over the prior decade, the conservation network in Hawaii worked toward a systematic approach to invasive species management, with broad consensus on prevention; early detection and rapid response for eradication; control methods for established species; integration with restoration efforts; monitoring effectiveness; and public outreach (Kraus and Duffy, 2010) . The HCA estimated conservation funding at $63 million and the number of staff at 737, which included scientists, land managers, laborers and graduate students (HCA, 2003) . Approximately $40 million was spent on invasive species control in 2006, reflecting $24 million spent on control, $8 on prevention, $4 million on eradication, $3 million on research, and $1 million on outreach and information (DLNR, 2007) . Thus, <3% of invasive species annual funding in Hawaii is spent on outreach and information.
Local value predispositions and the perception of hegemony
This section describes the value predisposition of local residents and how prior efforts to manage an invasive species shape public reception of conservation science. Far from the commercial and tourist centers of Honolulu, the Big Island has a distinctly rural geography, with a population of roughly 150,000 residents. For most of the 20th century, the island's economy was dependent upon cattle-grazing and sugar cane production, but beginning about 1990, these industries declined as global trade made Hawaiian agricultural products less competitive. Concurrently, popular aspirations for regional autonomy found expression in efforts to promote Hawaiian cultural and political sovereignty, tapping into anger against perceived and real US federal government hegemony over Hawaii. A small number of impassioned native Hawaiian activists call for full return of the monarchy and restoration of Hawaii's rights as a sovereign nation, and concomitant local control over land and resources (Silva, 2004) . This message appeals to multigenerational residents who value a quasi-subsistence lifestyle popular in rural Hawaii: fishing, pig hunting, and small-scale agriculture.
Local values are manifested in an unusually high interest and participation in local politics. The Big Island's County Council is known for its passionate debates about issues far beyond its jurisdiction. Council meetings are avidly attended and impassioned public testimony can last late into the night. The Big Island County Council passed over one hundred non-binding resolutions in one year, addressing topics from flu vaccines to the army's use of depleted uranium. Many of the contested issues that come before the council address the role of state and federal government agencies -and their scientists -in making land and resource decisions unpopular with some local residents. One of the most divisive issues is feral pig management.
Pigs figure prominently in Hawaiian culture and history. Early Hawaiians raised small Polynesian pigs in pens, but Europeans introduced the larger European boar and the practice of hunting (Burrows et al., 2007) . Hunting has become a common practice for many families of Hawaiian lineage as well as for the descendants of the plantation workers who settled Hawaii in the 18th and 19th centuries, supplementing their diets with the wild protein found in the forest. Where rural unemployment and food stamps are commonplace, men are able to feed their extended families with the meat from a single successful hunt. Hunting is socially valued as a noble act, and hunters are socially influential.
Conservationists are united in their assertion that feral pigs are a top threat to Hawaiian forest ecosystems. They root up and kill native plants, disturb soils and hydrological regimes, and facilitate the spread of exotic trees (Diong, 1982) . These direct impacts apparently have the indirect effect of degrading watersheds and eroding native faunal diversity (Nogueira-Filho et al., 2009) . Initially, the goals of hunters and conservationists were perceived as compatible: hunters could kill unlimited numbers of pigs, conservationists supported the reduction in pig populations. Compatibility converted to conflict when a natural area reserve manager ordered the installation of pig exclusion fences in the early 1990s without the recommended community consultation. Pig hunters were surprised to encounter a fence running through what they considered a key migration corridor for pigs, blocking their access to a prime hunting area (Burdick, 2005) . The backlash was severe. Hunters cut fences to allow pigs back into excluded areas around the state. Angry hunters and supporters bombarded public officials with letters and phone calls, with the result that all fencing projects throughout Hawaii were ordered to be stopped until public meetings and agreements with communities could be reached. Public meetings were so contentious that the state contracted with professionally trained federal mediators to facilitate (Josayma, 1996) . One common theme from public meetings emerged: resentment by the local people toward the advice brought by mostly white, mainland-born scientists whom they considered "outsiders." Hunters maintained that conservation scientists' assertion that pigs harmed forests was speculative. Thus, there is an established, popular narrative that conservation science is used by "outsider" government agencies to justify decisions that directly conflict with how rural Hawaiians use forests.
Organizing resistance to the proposed introduction
This section explains how a citizen activist appealed to these values in mobilizing public concerns to resist the proposed insect introduction. In addition to hosting longstanding residents, the Big Island has attracted people from the continental US seeking an alternative rural island lifestyle. These newer immigrants share a distrust of government agencies and suspicion of mainstream scientists, often framed with environmental protection discourses.
Opposition to the biocontrol agent release was coordinated by the "Save the Strawberry Guava" program of the "Good Shepherd Foundation," a local non-profit group, directed by Sydney Singer and his wife Soma Grismaijer. Singer describes himself as a medical anthropologist and director of the Institute for the Study of Culturogenic Disease. He and his wife authored a book asserting that bra wearing causes breast cancer (Singer and Grismaijer, 1995) . Their argument has been rejected by cancer researchers and the mainstream medical community, but was popular among some advocates for alternative medicine. Singer and Grismaijer (2005) directed their critique of consensus science to invasive species control efforts, specifically of the noisy Puerto Rican coqui frog (Eleutherodactylus coqui). Through websites dedicated to these issues and extensive advocacy via petitions, participation in public events, and postings on the internet and local bulletin boards, Singer constructed a public identity as a contrarian scientist who articulated local values and criticized government scientists.
Singer drew on this local credibility in his campaign against the T. ovatus introduction. His rhetorical strategy had two thrusts: raising questions about the trustworthiness of conservation scientists, and linking biocontrol of strawberry guava with the established narrative of government agency indifference to rural livelihoods. He published posters, local newspaper advertisements, and two dedicated web pages. He drew words and phrases from Johnson's federal petition (Johnson, 2005) and state EA (Johnson, 2008) , but then presented them in such a way as to directly contradict Johnson's findings. Singer thus selected from Johnson's risk communication to regulatory scientists and then constructed his own narrative -using scientific terms -to appeal to some local values. Evidence of the problem. Johnson's risk communication had been based on prior studies demonstrating that P. cattleianum was a significant threat to Hawaii's environment and an appropriate target. Johnson's documents thoroughly addressed the concerns of regulatory scientists, however, they reflected an assumption that P. cattleianum should be controlled for conservation purposes and did not provide evidence of its harm. Thus, Singer inverted Johnson's text so that it appeared Johnson had no evidence of harm.
The need for biocontrol. Johnson described the material success of small-scale manual removal efforts to illustrate that the intense, ongoing, and costly level of active management needed to reduce strawberry guava was not possible over large landscapes. He did not document the economic costs of local or regional removal. Singer interpreted this information to argue that that manual control was an effective strategy. In public meetings, he accused land managers of "laziness."
Predicting the risk of non-target effects. Mindful of the scientific debates about the risks of introduced biocontrol agents, Johnson used measured language to express confidence in the Singer drew from the same lexical field used by those who objected to pig fences. He claimed that free, wild food was under attack: "The strawberry guava provides free food, free wood and has been a cherished part of the Hawaiian culture and lifestyle for nearly 200 years. Stopping the spread of these valued plants by releasing an insect pest will negatively affect everyone in the state, depriving everyone, especially low-income people and native Hawaiians, of an important and nutritious food and wood resource" (Save the Strawberry Guava, 2008).
It was not that Singer was himself a credible messenger, but rather that he was able to discursively appeal to established narratives about government agencies and science. He raised public doubt regarding the proposed action with arguments that appealed to the value predisposition of local people: local self-reliance combined with some elements of sustainability discourse. Some local citizens, conservation scientists, and state spokespersons for invasive species control presented scientific and conservation rationales for introducing the biocontrol insect, but Singer rhetorically linked them to the government. Public employees were constrained by agency policy from responding to Singer's charges.
Singer persuaded the County Council to pass a resolution opposing the release of a biocontrol agent, putatively on the grounds of protecting the native ohia tree. "WHEREAS the use of insects … are being proposed by various State and Federal agencies for the control of non native species related to the ohia, such as the strawberry guava and WHEREAS these biological control agents may adapt and evolve to begin attacking related species, including the ohia … be it resolved that the use of biological control agents … for the control of any species of the family Myrtaceae be banned from use on the Island of Hawaii" (County of Hawai'i, 2008) . This was communicated to state agencies evaluating the release on state lands. Singer persuaded elected officials to introduce a bill in the state legislature that state agencies would "institute a five-year moratorium throughout the State on the use and release of biological control agents that could have a detrimental impact on food resources, affording the public the opportunity to use our State's natural resources to feed themselves and their families, and to improve the food self-sufficiency and sustainability of our State" (State of Hawaii House of Representatives, 2009 ). This bill was not brought to a committee vote.
In April 2008, the Hawaiian Office of Environmental Quality Control posted notice of four proposed biocontrol introductions, including T. ovatus (Office of Environmental Quality Control, 2008). Singer ignored the other three proposed introductions, but recruited public comments on the proposed introduction of T. ovatus. Most public comments reflected themes of Singer's campaign (see Table 2 ). The Hawaii Department of Agriculture (2010) subsequently created and released a new draft EA targeting a broader audience, and to more fully comply with state laws.
Public engagement, divergent environmental taxonomies and asymmetrical power
This section interprets competing communications of risk in light of public engagement on invasive species science and management. Scholars recommend public engagement holds out the promise of facilitating effective communication between scientists and members of the public (McCallie et al., 2009 ). Unlike the unidirectional information flows in public communication and public consultation, public engagement entails a dialogue of mutual learning in which citizens and scientists listen to and learn from one another about science and social values (Kleinman et al., 2011) . It can be evaluated by the degree to which relevant information is elicited from and exchanged by a range of social actors, and then consensually evaluated and enacted (Rowe and Frewer, 2005) . Ideally, public engagement can contribute to anticipating public concerns, for through such a process, government agencies could learn about local value predispositions that shape perceptions of management actions, and the conditions under which the local public might support a management action that could be perceived as problematic.
With <3% of the annual funding for invasive species control being spent on outreach and information, Hawaii's conservation network expended some resources to communicate with the public about this project, but did not create an effective public engagement process. The network communicated its message but outreach extended mainly to other members of the conservation network, rarely reaching the general public. A public consultation did occur at the public hearings held on each island by the State of Hawaii to evaluate Johnson's 2005 state permit application. At the state hearings held on each island, several members of the public expressed concern, but not opposition, and these were not well attended. Despite attempts by conservationists and regulators to communicate with local residents, few expressed opinions prior to Singer's activism. Were an ideal public engagement process created, conservation scientists could have shared their knowledge of the harm caused by P. cattleianum, their justification for a biocontrol strategy, and the (Bowker and Star, 1999) , and these correlated with power differences between social groups. For decades Hawaii's conservation scientists constructed a shared understanding that P. cattleianum harmed forest biodiversity and ecosystems. Johnson evaluated any risk of introducing T. ovatus within a framework that assumed the conservation value of reducing the harm caused by P. cattleianum. Johnson's permit application and EA were routine in the sense that they were designed to communicate his assessment of the risks of introducing T. ovatus to environmental regulatory officials and conservation scientists concerned about non-target effects of biocontrol agents. However, the assumption of the tree's harm was not shared by many members of the public. Many people develop affection for trees, whether native or naturalized (Coates, 2006) . If conservationists cannot convince the public that an invasive organism harms the environment, control efforts are unlikely to be popular. Conservation scientists and the lay public have divergent understandings of the boundaries between nature and human society (Milton, 2000) .
Singer manipulated these routine risk communications in the sense that he reframed and presented them to parties with different environmental values, understandings of science, and perceptions of the exercise of political power. Singer disregarded the assumption -broadly held among conservationists -that the strawberry guava tree caused harm. He never referred to it as P. cattleianum, preferring its Hawaiian language name, waiawi (see Table 1 ). Rather than an invasive tree, he described it as a source of food. Local knowledge and non-commodity economic use of the forest helped construct the social identity (Wynne, 1992) to which Singer appealed. For those who did not associate with pig hunters, Singer's presentation of the strawberry guava as a food resource made little sense, yet the notion of wild-harvested local food was appealing. For those who did hunt pigs or shared households with hunters, his presentation of "free, wild food under attack" appealed to those aggrieved by perceived government agency hegemony through pig control.
Insects in general are unpopular, especially relative to trees. For example, concurrent with the strawberry guava controversy, the Hawaiian Department of Agriculture released an exotic biocontrol insect elsewhere to control an invasive insect harming native trees. This was done without controversy, or comment by Singer. Prior outreach regarding invasive species had helped establish among the public in Hawaii the importance of "strict limits on importing harmful alien pests" (HCA, 2003: 11) . Singer highlighted the very fact that Johnson had evaluated the risks of T. ovatus, and discursively linked these to the established narrative of exotic insects posing a risk to Hawaii's environmental integrity. Singer described T. ovatus as a harmful alien pest, and its introduction inconsistent with conservation goals. More broadly, Singer reframed public discussion from the relatively narrow risk assessment of T. ovatus to a referendum on the credibility of government agencies.
The local values predisposition to which Singer appealed is not necessarily shared on other islands of Hawaii. For example, there is very strong support for invasive species control on Maui, as expressed by a large and active invasive species committee (ISC). Six of the Hawaiian Islands have partnerships to identify, control and eradicate exotic pests. Maui pioneered the ISC model, and hosts the most active committee in the state (Kraus and Duffy, 2010) . Maui officials voted to endorse the use of biocontrol for forest pests (County of Maui, 2009).
Several critical questions about the public understanding of invasive species science are cast into sharp relief by this case study. Could a public engagement process identify credible local authorities -outside of a conservation network -that could express local knowledge values while speaking in favor of invasive species control? Examples of this would be a pig hunter, or a native Hawaiian cultural leader who depended upon native forest plants for cultural practices. In a social context in which the credibility of government scientists comes under public attack, an effective public engagement process might identify such constituents to speak publicly in favor of invasive species control. However, skeptical members of the public could reasonably ask for greater transparency on the part of government agencies, and more responsiveness to community concerns, something government officials frequently resist. In the case of the light brown apple moth, the California Department of Food and Agriculture angered members of the public with their eradication campaign, but also with their approach to public communication (Chen, 2010) . Lay publics are acutely sensitive to "greenwashing," so any anticipatory risk communication of the sort proposed by the authors must therefore take seriously the broader concerns of publics.
When a gap exists between invasive species scientists and a network of opponents, in the absence of effective public engagement, the potential for a perverse outcome exists: augmented public mistrust of science institutions. This is true for biocontrol and eradication efforts. Public agencies become the object of public judgment, on the basis of their perceived trustworthiness. The expert risk assessments are based on scientific knowledge and assumptions not shared by lay publics, and thus when these communications enter the public sphere, they are susceptible to manipulation. A nimble activist can manipulate a scientific risk communication and appeal to public fears. In this light, government agencies appear poorly suited to cultivate public trust in invasive species science.
Could public engagement processes, begun early enough, help public agencies anticipate public concerns about invasive species management actions? To claim that a public engagement process would have avoided this conflict or addressed the public concerns in Table 2 would be speculative. More studies are needed of how public engagement processes shape public perception of invasive species control. However, the anticipatory learning about local values predispositions through public engagement processes could inform and improve invasive species management practice. The Hawaiian conservation network has recognized the importance of cultivating greater public awareness of and engagement with conservation issues in Hawaii (HCA, 2003; Warren, 2006) . However, resource allocation among various invasive species activities is determined by a diverse set of government bodies and agencies, and resources cannot be easily shifted between budget categories. The overwhelming majority of invasive species funding is spent on management efforts. A genuine public engagement process would require more than is currently allocated to public outreach. Unless more funding can be allocated to facilitate effective public engagement, agencies with invasive species management controversies will continue to be surprised by the irruption of public opposition to specific management actions. For example, in California, some of the same publics concerned about the spraying of synthetic insect pheromones might actively oppose the introduction of a new biocontrol agent, but CDFA has few means to anticipate this.
Conclusion
This case illustrates the obstacles to invasive species risk communication to the public, and its vulnerability to manipulation by an activist opponent. An activist with knowledge of the local values predisposition has a form of social power that can hold off government efforts to pursue conservation goals. This particular case study took place in an insular geographic context and required an unusual degree of commitment by an activist, yet it illustrates how routine risk communication can be manipulated by reframing deliberation about scientific management practices into a debate about the credibility of government scientists. In contrast to the highly idealized representations of negotiation in the environmental science literature (Gutrich et al., 2005) , this case illustrates how the routine communication processes of risk communication are vulnerable to manipulation by activists appealing to local values, such as local autonomy.
Effective public engagement has the potential to help public agencies anticipate public concerns about specific invasive species management actions, although this topical area merits more study, as does public engagement with environmental science more generally. Public engagement would require strategic reallocation of conservation funding, which would confront institutional obstacles. It would require greater transparency and responsiveness on the part of public agencies than has generally heretofore been the case.
By investigating the role of science communication in invasive species management, STS scholars can explore how science mediates knowledge of nature to the public (Yearley, 2007) , and how values predispositions shape its reception (Nisbet and Goidel, 2007) . The public interest character of conservation science and invasive species management provides robust opportunities for investigating public understandings of environmental science risk.
